Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
This page intentionally left blank. 
Introduction

Executive Overview
This report describes an airworthiness and operational approval approach and its risks for an Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) system on a USAF Unmanned Aerial System (UAS).
The approach follows the existing USAF airworthiness process to provide airworthiness approval of ABSAA-equipped UAS, and the approach is independent of the ABSAA technology.
The artifacts developed as part of the Tailored Airworthiness Certification Criteria (TACC) or Modified Airworthiness Certification Criteria (MACC) for a UAS with ABSAA will be sufficient for both airworthiness and operational approval, provided that the artifacts associated with the operational path are mapped to appropriate airworthiness criteria.
For operational approval, the ABSAA program should assist RTCA with developing a civil standard for ABSAA, work with the FAA to gain acceptance of the standard including any regulatory or policy changes if needed, and then the platform should follow the existing USAF Communications Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) process to enable Major Command (MAJCOM) operational approval and civil airspace access. Once a civil standard is available and accepted by the FAA, the current USAF CNS/ATM and operational approval processes require no further FAA review if the civil standard covers the desired operations.
The primary risk associated with this civil standards-based approach is schedule. RTCA will not complete its draft Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for ABSAA until July 2015 and the final MOPS by July 2016 at the earliest. 1 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must then decide whether to accept all, some, or none of these MOPS as a civil standard (i.e., Technical Standard Order and Advisory Circular) and possibly make a regulatory change which could take several more years. This timeline may not meet USAF needs.
It is also unclear whether the civil standards-based process can be executed absent a change to 14 CFR Part 91 regulations since UAS may not be able to use sensors to see-and-avoid, 2 in which case operational approval cannot be obtained through the civil standards-based process until the needed regulatory change is made.
If operational approval cannot be granted through the civil standards-based process, the ABSAA program should prepare for a risk mitigation approach option or "off-ramp." If the primary approach is not feasible, the program should work with stakeholders to develop a military standard for ABSAA approved by the USAF Technical Airworthiness Authority (TAA), then work with the FAA to obtain operational approval either through a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) or regulatory exemption. Current negotiations between the FAA and the Department of Defense (DoD) on operational approvals for UAS using Ground-Based Sense And Avoid (GBSAA) should inform the feasibility of this risk mitigation approach option.
The decision to proceed with the COA process versus a regulatory exemption as a risk mitigation approach option will depend on the scope of the operational need for ABSAA in the NAS. If operating at a limited number of sites, the COA process would likely be more expeditious. For larger scale fielding, a regulatory exemption should be considered. The COA process can collect data and operational experience and become a precursor to a regulatory exemption.
Purpose
This purpose of this report is to be a roadmap for ABSAA airworthiness and operational approval and to facilitate communication between stakeholders. This report summarizes current policies and procedures for airworthiness and operational approval and indicates how ABSAA can fit within their scope. The report will help stakeholders in establishing the formal airworthiness and operational approval path for ABSAA and help establish the roles and responsibilities for each stakeholder.
Related Documents
Air Force Instruction (AFI) AFI 11-202, Volume 3, "GENERAL FLIGHT RULES", Therefore, this report will focus on understanding the existing USAF airworthiness and operational approval processes and how they might be leveraged to field ABSAA on a USAF UAS.
Operational Approval and Safety Cases
This report also assumes that both USAF and FAA operational approvals are required to fly a USAF UAS in the NAS. It is through the operational approval process that the original requirement for a "safety case" emerged. FAA Interim Operational Approval Guidance 08-01 for UAS issued in 2008 stated, "…if the applicant makes a safety case and presents sufficient data for an alternate means of compliance, then this data should be taken into consideration and evaluated for possible approval." This guidance has been replaced by FAA Notice N 8900.227 "Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operational Approval" (issued in January 2013 as 8900.207 and updated in July 2013 as 8900.227) which states, "Proponents proposing see-and-avoid strategies in lieu of visual observers (VOs) are required to support proposed mitigations with system safety cases which indicate the operations can be conducted safely." While FAA Notices are not binding on the military Services, it should be noted that they are a statement of FAA 3 14 CFR 91.113(b): "When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. policy. The Notice provides a list of required safety case information (see paragraph 17 of N 8900.227) and acceptable hazard analysis tools and techniques that should be included in a safety case taken from When a civil standard exists, the FAA normally publishes a Technical Standard Order (TSO) and/or Advisory Circular (AC) explaining the types of safety evidence (i.e. "safety case") that will be needed for FAA approval. These types of evidence are factored into civil standards-based approval processes as described below. Because of the ambiguous nature of the term "safety case", this report will instead recommend that appropriate artifacts be added to the TACC or MACC to support the operational approval path chosen. An overview of the safety artifacts is listed in Table 1 . 
GBSAA Efforts
The Marine Corps GBSAA approval at Marine Corp Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point and Air Force GBSAA approval at Cannon Air Force Base will provide more details on the COA process for sense-and-avoid systems. An advantage of obtaining a COA is that it could be used to gather additional information to support lifting of restrictions or petitioning for an exemption down the road. The Air Force plans on operating under a COA initially. While the future ABSAA approval process may be different, the GBSAA efforts should provide additional information and a useful learning experience.
USAF Policies on Airworthiness and Operational Approval
Relevant USAF polices and processes were reviewed to determine how they can support airworthiness and operational approval of ABSAA on a USAF UAS for flight in the NAS. A primary focus for this review was to examine the organizational roles and responsibilities that lead to airworthiness and operational approval. Key excerpts from these instructions are provided in Appendix A. The USAF CNS/ATM Center of Excellence (COE) is recognized as the organization that uses civil standards to develop performance requirements for USAF CNS/ATM systems in support of the MAJCOM operational approval.
Relevant Air Force Policies
The PM is responsible for ensuring these requirements are tailored properly. 
Safety Stakeholders
From this review, it is apparent that there are many stakeholders responsible for flight safety. We note that the USAF policies show that the Program Manager has the largest role in establishing safety standards for SAA and coordinating them with all stakeholders. Airworthiness approval is provided through the TAA in AFMC. The existing USAF process is sufficient for supporting airworthiness approval of a UAS with ABSAA. However, the existing guidance, such as MIL-HDBK-516(), needs to be modified with specific SAA criteria. 8 Because the TAA has the responsibility for approving the airworthiness basis, it is recommended that specific airworthiness criteria and standards for SAA be coordinated with the relevant safety stakeholders, added to the airworthiness basis for the UAS platform equipped with ABSAA, and approved by the TAA. In researching this report, we spoke with the USAF Airworthiness Office (AFLCMC/EZ 9 ) and learned that ABSAA is viewed differently than GBSAA in terms of scope (see Figure 1 , extracted from a presentation by AFLCMC/EZ). For ABSAA, the USAF Airworthiness Office views all components of SAA system as subject to airworthiness approval. This is different than for GBSAA, as many elements are not subject to airworthiness approval (e.g., sensors, tracker, and algorithms reside off-board the UAS platform and external to the ground control station). For the GBSAA implementation at Cannon AFB, the USAF is pursuing a separate "safety case" issued by the USAF Safety Center to provide safety evidence for those items outside of the airworthiness scope. Given the contrast in Figure 1 , the TACC or MACC for ABSAA would include all of the safety artifacts needed for airworthiness approval. To that end, Chapter 11 of MIL-HDBK-516 "Avionics" states that "Avionics certification criteria apply to manned air vehicle avionics, as well as airborne and ground segment avionics for UAV/RPA."
10 The first criterion in chapter 11 states in part, "11.1.1 Avionics subsystems. Verify that the number and type of sensors, data processors, data buses, controls and displays, and communications devices are adequate for SOF [safety of flight] considerations." The supporting documents for this criterion include references to "…military performance requirements necessary for safe access to civil airspace." Therefore, it is believed that the standards and methods of compliance for this criterion (and others) can and should include the required artifacts to achieve operational approval. Thus, for a USAF UAS equipped with ABSAA, the TACC or MACC would be sufficient to support airworthiness and operational approval provided that the artifacts associated with the operational path chosen are mapped to appropriate airworthiness criteria.
Civil Standards-Based Operational Approval
Figure 2 diagrams the key steps, described in this section, in the civil standards-based operational approval approach for an ABSAA system on a USAF UAS. The standard USAF CNS/ATM and operational approval processes are predicated on having an existing civil standard. Figure 3  11 shows that the first step in the civil standards-based operational approval process is "Civil Authority Publishes CNS/ATM Standard". Currently there is no civil performance standard for ABSAA, but one is under development. RTCA Special Committee 228 is leading an effort to define a civil ABSAA performance standard (e.g., MOPS) no earlier than July 2015 with final MOPS due in July 2016. Once MOPS are published, the FAA then must decide whether to accept all, some, or none of the MOPS as the basis for a TSO and AC. This process may take between five months 12 to several years. The USAF could trade schedule risk for performance risk by utilizing draft versions of the MOPS for development and testing while waiting on the FAA-accepted versions for actual airworthiness and operational approval.
Operations in the NAS
After the civil standard is available, the CNS/ATM Center of Excellence (COE), established within AFMC AFLCMC/HBAG, will create a Generic Performance Matrix (GPM) with the SAA performance requirements. This GPM is then tailored with the platform program office to form a Tailored Performance Matrix (TPM), which is used as the basis for CNS/ATM compliance determination in a Letter of Compliance (LOC) that is used for both the TAA airworthiness approval and MAJCOM operational approval.
This approach allows the USAF to exercise the proper due diligence per Title 10 CFR responsibilities and keep the airworthiness and operational approval within USAF agencies without burdening the FAA with additional risk analysis. This civil standards-based process is This approach also paves the way for easier approval of the ABSAA system on platforms beyond the first integration since the standards are published and accepted. Another advantage of this process is that it is an established process with a track record of success for providing operational approval of CNS/ATM technologies for USAF aircraft. Additionally, approvals are good indefinitely and do not require renewal, unless the ABSAA system or related components are modified. If there is a safety issue that arises, the ABSAA system would need modifying and therefor would require a renewal of the CNS/ATM LOC and airworthiness approval.
However, it is currently unclear whether the civil standards-based process can be executed for ABSAA absent a change to 14 CFR 91.113 and other rules in Part 91. 13 Some stakeholders believe that a change is needed since sensors cannot be used to "see," and use the example of the need for a rule change to enable reduced minimums for Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS).
14 Others argue that a SAA system can meet the Part 91 regulations as currently written. If changes to these regulations are required for the USAF to execute the civil standards-based process, this approach may not be a feasible path to obtain timely operational approval for a UAS to operate with ABSAA. A working group has been established under the UAS Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) to recommend changes to 14 CFR 91.113 to "enable (not preclude) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations."
15 Even if the regulations are not changed, the civil standards can still be leveraged to facilitate a streamlined COA or regulatory exemption FAA approval.
This approach assumes that the scope of the civil standards will sufficiently cover ABSAA operations planned by the USAF. The Terms of Reference (TOR) for SC-228 define the scope of the Phase 1 MOPS as being limited to operations transiting through Class D, E, and G airspace to/from, and operations in, Class A or Special Use Airspace. The scope is also limited to larger UAS flying Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). 16 If the civil standards do not cover the operations planned by the USAF, then the risk-mitigation operational approach option described in section 3.4 would be necessary.
Risk Mitigation Operational Approval Option
If the civil standards-based process cannot be completed either due to schedule or absence of a needed rule change, an alternate risk mitigation approach option for USAF operational approval would be to pursue approval through the AFMC TAA and a FAA COA or exemption. In this "off-ramp," the USAF would develop a military standard for ABSAA performance (e.g., Target Level of Safety, Risk Ratios, etc.) approved by the AFMC TAA and included in the TACC or MACC. The basis for the military standard may be in a revision to MIL-HDBK-516() or any civil standards that had been developed at the time. For USAF operational approval, avionics subject matter experts in AFMC could provide a letter to the Program Manager recommending 13 SC-228 Terms of Reference: "The Phase One DAA MOPS will be developed assuming that the requirements for UAS DAA operation while the UAS is in Class A airspace will be specified outside of the MOPS (e. FAA operational approval would also need to be obtained through either the COA process or a regulatory exemption 18 from 14 CFR 91.113 and/or 91.181. Either of these paths (COA or regulatory exemption) would require negotiation with the FAA to show that the risks have been mitigated to acceptable levels. As noted earlier, differences between military and civil system safety processes could create instances of risks being acceptable under military criteria that would not be deemed as acceptable by the FAA.
19 Current negotiations between the FAA and DoD on FAA operational approvals for UAS using GBSAA may inform the feasibility of this path and guide the contents of safety artifacts that should be added to the TACC or MACC.
The FAA may require operations under a COA to collect operational data prior to approving an exemption. The decision to proceed with the COA process versus a regulatory exemption as a risk mitigation approach option will depend on the scope of the operational need for ABSAA in the NAS. If operating at a limited number of sites, the COA process would likely be more expeditious. For larger scale fielding, a regulatory exemption should be considered.
In the absence of a civil standard, it is not well understood whether an ABSAA system built to a military standard would have the performance necessary to fly in the areas of the NAS for which the system is designed without additional mitigations. However, if the military standard used was based on a MOPS or draft MOPS, the risk of the standard not being acceptable by the FAA is lessened.
This risk mitigation option is diagrammed in Figure 4 . 17 For the case of RVSM, the DoD Policy Board for Federal Aviation formally coordinated with the FAA to obtain recognition of its military approval of its aircraft to meet RVSM performance standards. 18 14 CFR §11.15, CFR §11.63, and CFR §11.81 describe this process. We note that USAF Instruction 11-202, Volume 3 specifies that a COA is currently required. 19 These differences include incongruities in hazard severity definitions, quantitative hazard likelihoods, and risk acceptance authorities. 
MAJCOM
Operations in the NAS
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA)
Using the COA process, the MAJCOM operating the UAS would apply for a COA from the FAA. The FAA is authorized to grant waivers and authorizations under 14 CFR 91.903 and 91.905. The COA would be limited to a specific platform and specific locations. Safety artifacts would need to be provided in accordance with FAA Notice N 8900.227 paragraph 17. These would be reviewed through the FAA's SMS process by the Safety Risk Management Panel (SRMP).
An advantage of the COA process is that there is an established and documented path for operation approval. This path is being used by DoD UAS today, by the USAF Cannon GBSAA project, and by the Cherry Point GBSAA program. Additionally, there is no public comment period required, which reduces the approval timeline.
The primary disadvantage of using the COA process is the results are limited to the initial locations and platform integrating ABSAA. The use of ABSAA by additional platforms or in additional locations would require a repetition of the entire COA process. The COA must also be renewed every one to two years, as determined by the FAA.
Regulatory Exemption
Using the regulatory exemption process, AF/A3O in coordination with the MAJCOM operating the UAS would petition for an exemption from all or parts of 14 CFR 91.113 and/or 91.181.
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The regulatory exemption process would be conducted in accordance with 14 CFR 11.15, 11.63 and 11.81. As with the COA process, the FAA would have to review the safety artifacts in accordance with the FAA's SMS process. The duration of the exemptions can vary from a few years to no expiration; however, the majority of the exemptions require renewal after 2 years. The history of the exemption from 14 CFR 91.209 related to NVG operations without external lights (FAA Exemption 7960) is detailed in Appendix B as it most closely relates to UAS SAA operations since NVG operations limit the See and Avoid capability. Little empirical data or safety artifacts were provided by the USAF to justify the lights out operations. This is unlikely to be the case with ABSAA approval due to the higher political visibility and the FAA's recently instituted SMS process. The FAA did take into account the USAF's "sufficient operational experience" in granting the exemption. Also, the FAA, in issuing the exemption, imposed additional restrictions on the operations beyond those proposed by the USAF, which may also be the case with an ABSAA exemption. However, unlike existing UAS COAs, the lights out exemption applies to a large number of MOAs, but additional activities, such as establishing a Letter of Agreement with nearby ATC facilities, are required for each MOA used.
The advantage of the regulatory exemption approach is the exemption could be broadly applied to other platforms with the ABSAA system or possibly other ABSAA systems that comply with the military standard.
The disadvantage is the length of time required to obtain an exemption. A public comment period is required which could be politically sensitive. The regulatory exemption from parts of 14 CFR 91.209 for NVG lights out training in MOAs took a year and a half to complete.
Conclusions
This report set out to investigate existing USAF airworthiness and operational approval processes and how they might be leveraged to field ABSAA on a USAF UAS for flight in the NAS. It also explored the concept of a safety case that may be needed for airworthiness and operational approval.
We find that the existing USAF airworthiness process is appropriate to provide airworthiness approval of ABSAA assuming the civil standards operational approval process is used, and that the artifacts developed as part of the TACC (or MACC) for a UAS with ABSAA can be sufficient to support both airworthiness and operational approval if properly tailored.
We recommend that SAA-specific criteria and standards should be added to the TACC and that USAF policies place the responsibility on the platform PM to coordinate these criteria and standards with all relevant safety stakeholders.
The optimal approach for obtaining operational approval for fielding ABSAA on a USAF UAS for flight in the NAS is to assist RTCA with developing a civil standard for ABSAA, work with the FAA to gain their recognition and acceptance of the standard, and then follow the existing USAF civil standards-based operational approval process. This approach has low technical risk, the advantage of being a proven process, and the most flexibility for the USAF with the fewest FAA restrictions. However, this approach carries schedule risk and the risk of the civil standard not sufficiently covering the operations planned by the USAF.
The alternate approach option involves working with safety stakeholders to develop a military standard for ABSAA approved by the USAF TAA, and then work with the FAA to obtain operational approval through a COA or regulatory exemption to sections of 14 CFR Part 91. Most of the same safety artifacts needed for the civil standards-based process can be used for a COA or regulatory exemption.
We recommend laying the ground work for this option in case a platform has an operational need whose deployment schedule is ahead of the civil standard's availability and the availability of a 14 CFR Part 91 rule change (if needed).
Because ABSAA is viewed as a new technology, this report can serve as a starting point for the ABSAA PM to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between USAF safety stakeholders to formalize roles and responsibilities for USAF airworthiness and operational approvals.
The platform PM should ensure that the safety case artifacts in FAA Notice N 8900.227 are incorporated into the airworthiness plan for the ABSAA-enabled UAS platform. Existing and ongoing work on MIL-HDBK-516 updates in regards to UAS and SAA should also be included in the airworthiness plan.
Robust ABSAA program office participation in RTCA activities to develop civil standards for ABSAA will ensure the scope and assumptions in the standard are compatible with USAF UAS operations. The program office should also follow the work of the UAS ARC to understand the impact and schedule of a possible Part 91 rule change. The ABSAA PM should work to ensure appropriate FAA participation in RTCA activities to enable timely acceptance of RTCA MOPS in FAA TSO(s) and AC(s).
With regard to the risk mitigation approach option, the ABSAA PM should coordinate USAF safety stakeholder participation in planned Office of the Secretary of Defense SAA Science and Research Panel activities. This will familiarize military airworthiness authorities with the findings of the SAA Workshop report, which will support the goal of establishing a military performance standard for ABSAA. These standards would then be added to the airworthiness plan and included in the TACC (or MACC). Additionally, the ABSAA Program Office should track developments of negotiations between DoD and the FAA for operational approval of GBSAA systems for possible application to ABSAA.
Appendix A Excerpts from USAF Instructions
• Airworthiness is the verified and documented capability of an air system configuration to safely attain, sustain, and terminate flight in accordance with (IAW) the approved aircraft usage and operating limits. The air system Program Manager (PM) is responsible for planning and executing airworthiness programs for managed aircraft IAW AFPD 62-6 and this instruction." o "A design-based airworthiness assessment shall be conducted when (a) an airworthiness certification basis can be established consisting of a specified set of design criteria, and (b) the design of an air system can be assessed for compliance with the specified criteria. This is the only path which will lead to military certification of the type design and airworthiness certification of individual aircraft." o "1.3.1. Independent Airworthiness Approval. The TAA, or delegated official .
. . shall approve the basis for air system airworthiness certification, tailored airworthiness certification criteria (TACC), and reportable modification airworthiness certification criteria ( The FAA addressed all of the comments in the Federal Register and granted the exemption to the USAF. The FAA specifically called out the "sufficient operational experience" the military has had with NVG operations in the NAS including those conducted under FAA exemption 5891, which "permits the USAF to conduct helicopter NVG flight training operations without lighted position or anticollision lights at or below 500 feet above ground level," and FAA exemption 7687, which "permits NVG flight training at or above 18,000 feet in air traffic control assigned airspace areas." The FAA also followed AOPA's recommendation to add information to the Airman's Information Manual (AIM).
The FAA did not agree with the USAF's equivalent level of safety argument and imposed additional restrictions on approved lights-out operations. The FAA also modified some of the USAF's proposed restrictions to make them even more restrictive. Specifically the FAA restrictions for lights-out operations were:
1. Operations must be in MOAs listed in the exemption 2. Operations must be monitored by military personnel with a radar capable of detecting nonparticipating aircraft including those without transponders or with small radar cross-sections 3. Participating aircraft must monitor a designated frequency with the monitoring military personnel, to enable pilots to restrict operations, return to normal lighting, and alter course if necessary if a non-participating aircraft enters the operational airspace 4. NOTAMs must be issued 48 hours in advance 5. USAF must brief civil airspace users within 100nm of the MOA annually; provide advisories to transient aircraft; and establish LOA with ATC responsible for MOA airspace 6. Military pilots must be familiar with the lights-out operational restrictions 7. Failure to comply can result in revocation or cancelation of the exemption The exemption expired on 31 January 2005 (two years).
B.3 FAA Extensions and Amendments
The FAA granted an extension and amendment to exemption 7960 on 28 August 2004 (FAA exemption 7960A) based on a request from AFFSA on 7 July 2004. In addition to extending the exemption, the request also petitioned the FAA to allow aircraft from other military services to participate in lights-out operations while conducting joint operations.
The AFFSA request stated that were no changes to the conditions or reasons relative to the public interest or safety in the approval basis for the exemption. The FAA determined that since the amendment to the exemption would not set a precedent and any delay would be detrimental to the USAF, no summary of the petition had to be published in the Federal Register.
The exemption was extended to 31 January 2007 (two more years) and the conditions and restrictions of the original exemptions still applied. AFFSA requested another amendment and extension on 7 November 2008. The request asked for additional MOAs to be listed along with changing the exemption expiration to 5 years. The FAA responded on 22 January 2009 with an amendment and extension (FAA exemption 7960C). The FAA again decided against publishing the petition in the Federal Register and added the requested MOAs. However, the FAA did not agree with the 5-year timeframe and instead extended the exemption until 31 January 2012 (3 more years). The FAA also changed the terminology from NVG to Night Vision Device (NVD).
On 5 January 2009, AFSAA requested an amendment to the exemption to allow FAA ATC personnel and radars to provide separation between participating USAF aircraft and nonparticipating aircraft. The FAA rejected this amendment on 11 May 2009 (FAA exemption 7960D) since primary radar must be used for separation, and FAA ATC personnel do not usually use primary radar and would be unable to provide separation from non-transponder, nonparticipating aircraft. Additional the FAA does not have the resources to separate nonparticipating aircraft.
The final amendment and extension was granted on 6 December 2011 by the FAA (FAA exemption 7960E). The amendment added additional MOAs and extended the exemption until 31 January 2015 (3 more years). The amendment also added one more restriction:
1. The exemption is not valid outside the U.S.
